Honest judges, trustworthy judges

A few weeks ago, a journalist announced on VGNyhetter, a major Norwergian news website, that 19 Norwegian judges have heard cases in which insurance companies were parties, while the judges had shares in these insurance companies. The journalists Frank Haugsbø and Geir Olsenen have skilfully embroidered their story, including stories from the parties who lost those cases. Those parties now, of course, say that they could have saved a lot of money and effort, or that they would have challenged the judges if they would have known. The question is whether they would have received a different judgement then. Continue reading

The BREXIT and the international ambitions of the Dutch judiciary

Earlier this year, the Council for the Judiciary released a plan to establish a Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC). In the plan it was stated that the NCC would start on the 1st of January 2017. By now, a starting date of July 1st, 2017 seems more realistic. The upcoming Brexit makes this, in itself already stimulating, plan even more interesting. Will this boost the chances for this special provision for international commercial cases in Amsterdam? In this blog I will discuss the reasons for this initiative, the innovative aspects of it and its chances of success in light of the Brexit. Continue reading

Brexit: why EU leaders should hold their horses

According to art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”, Lisbon version), “any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. In February of this year the European Parliament published a briefing informing citizens and politicians of the backgrounds and the debate on this provision (published here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf). (For those with an academic interest in the issue, I highly recommend the piece by my friend Adam Łazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership’ that is referenced). No doubt, the aftermath of the Brexit referendum has brought on a profound constitutional crisis in Britain which will take time to play out. EU leaders, while understandably frustrated and deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of this period of profound uncertainty for the economy and indeed for the very future of the European project, should realize that putting pressure on the UK to submit a notification subject to art. 50 TEU won’t help – and that frankly, it is not the most mature response either. Continue reading

Why the Tribunal Dealing with the South China Sea Dispute Should Step Aside to Make Way for a Negotiated Settlement – Ruikun Sun, Tom Zwart

Increasingly, in the West, in the class rooms of law schools and offices of foreign ministries, international law is being associated exclusively with courts and tribunals. The idea seems to be that something can only be regarded as law if it emanates from an international court. This judicialization of international law overlooks the fact that these international bodies owe their existence to treaties, which are concluded by states, which still are the main actors in international law. Continue reading

When It Rains, It Pours: Tracking the recent developments in international criminal justice – Julie Fraser, Brianne McGonigle Leyh

International criminal justice has a reputation for being slow and progressing at a ‘glacial’ pace. For example, it took the International Criminal Court (ICC) ten years before it handed down its first judgment in the Lubanga case after it started operating in 2002. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has a reputation for slowness; particularly after some trials lasted longer than six or more years. Court watchers are all too aware of the slow, sporadic developments coming out of these courts, and often eagerly await judgments. That is why the months of March and April 2016 were so anticipated, as they provided a windfall of developments within international criminal justice. The old expression is true: when it rains, it pours! Continue reading

The Unity of Law 3: A step towards a definition and instruments that can optimize the unity of law

Introduction

In my previous blog I gave a modest impetus to define the concept of ‘the unity of law’ and I have discussed a number of instruments which in any case (also) aim to optimize the unity of law. The following four instruments are distinguished: institutional reform, preliminary ruling procedure, coordination and a differentiated discursive substantiation requirement. The first instrument was discussed in my previous blog. I will now discuss the other three instruments. Continue reading

The claim industry as object of research

Under the headline ‘The claim industry’, the Volkskrant on Saturday the 27th of February devoted attention to the increase in the number of collective redress procedures in the Netherlands. The figures presented by the newspaper are clear: organisations who allegedly represent half a million people, have in total claimed 1.6 billion euros in damages from businesses and institutions. Yet this message will not have surprised the average newspaper reader. The media regularly reports about new collective redress procedures and many people will have asked themselves whether they should not have also joined the proceedings. Who does not have an insurance policy which appeared to have excessive charges, drive a car with rigged software, play the State Lottery or regularly take the NS train during rush hour? Only a few people would consider litigating for themselves to recover these kinds of damages. The amounts of losses are too low and the costs and risks of litigation are too high. One speaks here of ‘scattered damage’. However, if the claims are combined in a collective claim for damages, it suddenly involves significant amounts and it becomes a very different matter. Continue reading

The Unity of Law 2: A step towards a definition and instruments that can optimize the unity of law

In his ‘The Unity of Law 1: Blogging about the unity of law?’, Eddy Bauw gave an inspiring kick-off on the subject of the unity of law. It is the intention to – with this blog as a starting point – start a series about that topic. With this blog and the next blog, this challenge is taken up. Continue reading

The civil law sanctioning of violations of the principles of civil procedure

In December 2015 my book ‘Principles of civil procedure’ was published as part of the Asser Procesrecht-series (‘Beginselen van burgerlijk procesrecht’ Wolters Kluwer: Deventer 2015). In this book, I discuss, after some general considerations, the guiding principles of civil procedure from a Dutch and European perspective. Based on the research into and the analysis of the seven discussed principles of civil procedure, I included in the General Considerations a chapter on ‘Sanctions after violations of a principle of civil procedure’. From my research into the seven specific principles dealt with, I had quickly discovered that the sanctioning of violations of those principles (which are almost always protected as a human right under Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 EU Charter) is rather shabbily endowed in the Netherlands. The theme is hardly discussed in the doctrine and rarely any specific rules (through legislation or case law) exist. Therefore, we seem to be unable, as yet, to cope adequately with the sanctioning of such violations. I am convinced that this is a bad state of affairs, that we need an urgent improvement and that – fortunately – there is a solution available. Continue reading

Montesquieu and marginal review

In Dutch administrative law, a familiar view entails that the administrative court should not ‘occupy the chair of the executive’. By virtue of its powers, the government would have a ‘discretionary latitude of decision’ in which it is only under democratic control; insofar as it is not a matter of a ‘criminal charge’ there is only space for judicial review beyond the ‘edges’ of the administrative domain. In literature the ‘marginal test’ encounters increasing criticism. Many advocate that the Dutch administrative review of proportionality should align itself to EU law and German law, in which judicial control on proportional weighing of interests has a broader significance. The ever ongoing ‘withdrawal of the legislature’ would require a more sophisticated and nuanced approach whereby the judge can intensify his review in cases in which there is no punitive decision, but nonetheless a breach of important interests or fundamental rights. In addition to the literature, the courts are tending towards a broader review of proportionality. Apart from the question whether there was a ‘criminal charge’, the Administrative Law Division recently ended the so-called ‘alcolock programme'; upon application of that regulation it considered a proportionate weighing of interests ‘insufficiently guaranteed’.[1] Continue reading