The division of power between the legislator – represented by ‘the political’ – and the judge – represented by ‘the legal’ – is a centuries-old dilemma. The question on which position both powers take in the constitutional context is an everyday reality for the (constitutional) lawyer. The balance between these powers often turns into a tense relationship – a tension that becomes especially tangible after courts important judgments, such as the Urgenda case. Cases seem increasingly to end up in court because politicians have no answer to the issues at hand. If in such a case a court makes a decision, then politicians are eager to emphasise that the court has illegitimately taken up the role of the democratically elected legislator and that it is up to the people to make a decision; not the court. The question, however, is whether this criticism is always justified. Do politicians indeed try to protect the institutional balance as set out in the Constitution? Or do they act as sore losers, looking for a scapegoat for their own failure? Continue reading
The #metoo campaign has once again shown what social media are capable of: stirring a worldwide debate on important issues for people and society and questioning power structures that are not or cannot be put on trial in the same way in traditional media, politics and courts. But also: destroying reputations, careers and relationships, creating large-scale gossip and speculation and forcing people to their knees who know that there is no chance to defend themselves against the storm unleashed by this puny but unassailable mark.
At the same time, human rights treaties not only state that the human body is inviolable, but also stipulate innocence until proved guilty. But what good does this? People are groped involuntary on a massive scale and at the same time people are subjected to a rhetoric of naming and shaming without due process. In this blog, I argue that the presumption of innocence has been neglected wrongfully by lawyers and that now is the time to let it live up to its expectations, also with regard to the media. Continue reading
The European Commission has a justice policy which involves all national judiciaries, whose functioning is monitored. However I argue that this monitoring is done unsatisfactory. Justice is an important subject in the European Union. For example, trade and crime do cross borders and economic competition contracts and regulations need the guarantee of enforceability. It is obviously unavoidable that a lot of European law is involves regulation and law enforcement. National judiciaries play an important role in the enforcement of EU-law. And it seems perfectly justified that the European Commission monitors the functioning of those national judiciaries. The monitoring of that function is done through the so-called Justice Scoreboard. This Justice Scoreboard, however, is a methodologically inadequate device to evaluate the functioning of national justice systems. The main problem of the Justice Scoreboard is that the data it is based on are overall not reliable and based on nationally – differently! – defined statistics. Consequently, national numbers cannot adequately be compared, which leads to a misleading presentation of the data in bar charts. Continue reading
In the May 16th edition, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung lets us have it right between the eyes: ‘Is the ECJ ruling justified?’. This question, enclosed in a polling-feature, regarding Opinion 2/15 on the EU’s powers to conclude the EU-Singapore Trade Deal, is intriguing – perhaps even revolutionary. Probably for the first time, a European newspaper included internet polling to shed light on the public debate over ECJ decision making. Such a ‘popular judicial culture poll’ works two ways. It is not only a useful public opinion indicator, it also encourages readers to think about the European Court of Justice (ECJ) not as some alien institution but rather as part of the national public debate. As I will argue in this blog post, this popular judicial poll is one of the most recent ‘bottom-up’ signs of alignment between European judicial cultures, that is, the ideas and practices regarding judging and judicial organisation which have developed over time.
According to art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”, Lisbon version), “any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. In February of this year the European Parliament published a briefing informing citizens and politicians of the backgrounds and the debate on this provision (published here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf). (For those with an academic interest in the issue, I highly recommend the piece by my friend Adam Łazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership’ that is referenced). No doubt, the aftermath of the Brexit referendum has brought on a profound constitutional crisis in Britain which will take time to play out. EU leaders, while understandably frustrated and deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of this period of profound uncertainty for the economy and indeed for the very future of the European project, should realize that putting pressure on the UK to submit a notification subject to art. 50 TEU won’t help – and that frankly, it is not the most mature response either. Continue reading